Abstract-Security protocols are the foundation of modern secure networked systems. Proving security properties of cryptographic protocols is a challenge problem. Model checking has proven useful for finding certain classes of errors in network security protocols, but it is based on bounded model or constraint solving, and provides little insight into why a protocol is correct. While theorem proving puts no bound on the size of the principal and requires no state space enumeration. We present novel proof rules and mechanisms for protocol actions and temporal reasoning to check security properties of cryptographic protocols using logic of events theory. The logic is an event-ordering which extended by seven special event classes New, Send, Receive, Sign, Verify, Encrypt, and Decrypt, and axioms AxiomK, AxiomR, AxiomV, AxiomD, AxiomS, AxiomF, Disjointness axioms and Flow relation. As a case study, our method is illustrated by showing the proof of the modified Needham-Schroeder protocol. Result shows the logic of events is feasible and general for analyzing cryptographic protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
Proving security properties of network protocols is a complex problem. Formal method is a powerful method to prove the security properties of cryptographic protocols, which mainly includes model checking and theorem proving two parts. Existing methods based on model-checking are useful for finding bugs, but do not guarantee protocol security for an unbounded number of sessions. Theorem proving can deal with infinite state space problem. While explicit reasoning about traces that containing honest principals' and attacker's actions using theorem-proving approaches requires considerable effort and expertise. Many scholars have done in-depth research on theorem proving method, and achieved remarkable achievement [1] [2] .
A recent development in formal security protocol analysis is the Logic of Events [3] [4] . In 2003 Mark Bickford defined a logic of events [4] that justifies the extraction of correct distributed processes from constructive proofs that system specifications are achievable, and the extraction process in logic of events can be implemented in the context of construction type theory. The researchers have made great contribution to logic of events [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In this paper, we describe specific extension and mechanism to logic of events, we call authentication event logic. Authentication event logic guarantees that any well-typed protocol is robustly safe under attack while reasoning only about the actions of honest principals in the protocol. It puts no bound on the size of the principal and requires no state space enumeration and it is decidable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the notations and operational semantics for event of logic. Section 3 inference rules are given. Section 4 presents six signification axioms. Case study is discussed in section 5 with conclusions in section 6.
II. THE NOTATIONS AND SEMANTICS
This section describes the notations and semantics for analyzing security properties of cryptographic protocols. First we give a few symbols and the meaning of them: m m m ∨
III. INFERENCE RULES
First we introduce an event-ordering and corresponding type ProtocolAction . Every event has a location, and there is a natural causal-ordering on the set of events, the ordering first considered by Lamport [11] . This allows us to define an event-ordering, a structure, , , , E loc in fo 〈 < 〉, in which the causal ordering < is transitive relation on E that is well-founded, and locally-finite(each event has only finitely many predecessors). Also, the events at a given location are totally ordered by < . The information, ( ) in fo e , associated with event e is the message input to ( ) loc e when the event occurred.
We describe protocols by classifying the events in the protocol. In authentication protocols there are send, receive, nonce, sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt events. Events in each class have associated information, and the type of this information depends on the class of the event. Corresponding with the seven event classes [12] [13] we defined a type ProtocolAction of the allowed actions. The members of ProtocolAction are in one of the seven sets are give out in figure 2.
: ( 
Fig. 1 Event classes of the authentication theroy

New EClass Atom Send Rcv EClass Data Encrypt Decrypt EClass Data Key Atom Sign Verify EClass Data Id Atom
Predicates of has and potentially has Two axioms describe disjointness assumptions. The first simple and clear says that an event in and only in one of the seven special classes. As follows, it is described concisely using a function : :
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Because a signature may be an application of a cryptographic hash technology, so a ciphertext may be a signature of a plaintext. The second says that on condition the hash of a well-formed member of type Data a signature will not be equal to a ciphertext. 
(4) Honest axiom
Honest agents keep their private keys, so the signer of sign events must be honest, and decryption or encryption events that use the private key must occur at the honest agent. We named this axiom AxiomS 
The actions in any of the seven special classes define as type Act . The relation ( e a has ) is true when action e has atom a. There is an obvious conclusion as below: We have adopted this method to analyze several cryptographic protocols. It suggests that this is a promising and feasible method to prove authentication property of cryptographic protocols. We focus on the reduced modified Needham-Schroeder protocol which increases the time stamp as an example. .Suppose A and B are both honest and obey NS protocol. Because we defined that the events at a given location are totally ordered by < , while in the modified NS protocol we increase the time stamp, according to the inferences and AxiomD , AxiomF are easy to proof that the modified NS protocol is security.
VI. CONCLUSION
We propose a novel method to prove authentication property of cryptographic protocols based on event logic. The structure of event ordering, , , , E loc in fo 〈 < 〉 , satisfies that events at one location totally ordered [14] . The event ordering is extended by axioms and seven special event classes. We figure out types for the keys, nonces, and messages of the protocol and present novel proof rules and mechanisms for protocol actions and temporal reasoning. The proof of modified Needham-Schroeder protocol illustrates that our method is general to analyze authentication property of cryptographic protocols. We have constructed a platform to verify authentication property of cryptographic protocols. Future work we will attempt to add theorem proving to the verification platform. The fixed platform will achieve automatically to prove authentication property of cryptographic protocols.
